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Abstract
A large part of the Nile basin is considered 
as one of the poorest regions of the world. Wa-
ter scarcity is a major challenge for this already 
closed basin. The challenge is further exacerbated 
by climate variability. Thus, the immediate na-
tional interests of the riparian countries are tak-
ing priority over the basin based strategy. After a 
decade of failed attempts to initiate cooperation, 
the countries of the Nile basin have again started 
adopting conflicting postures over the water. Po-
litical tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia as a 
result of the unilateral construction of the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and the 
Ethiopian refusal to halt construction until the re-
quired studies were concluded, have fed the his-
torical mistrust between the two countries. Each 
country has sought to maintain old alliances and 
form new regional relations to influence the inter-
ests of the other in the Nile basin and the Horn 
of Africa. This approach continued even after the 
two countries reached a general understanding on 
resolving the crisis over the GERD. It is necessary 
for the important riparian states of the Nile basin 
to abandon their state-centric water development 
approach and develop sustainable cooperation 
over the shared water to meet the climate change 
challenges.
I. Introduction
Water, as a vital resource not only for human 
beings but also for whole life on the Earth, has 
become one of the most important issues in inter-
national relations. Even though water is a renew-
able resource, degradation on ecological systems, 
mostly due to human activities of last centuries, 
has begun to destroy water cycle which ensures 
the sustainability of waters on Earth. Whilst the 
quantity of freshwater on the world is limited and 
main freshwater resources (rivers and lakes) are 
not distributed evenly, struggle on these resourc-
es, especially on transboundary waters, turns into 
a challenging problem. The developing ecological 
cooperation set up for fair, equitable, and sus-
tainable use and sharing of transboundary waters 
would eliminate security risks in the basin and 
could ensure the development of a common objec-
Toin University of Yokohama 
Research Bulletin, No.43, Dec. 2020 




tive towards the improvement of socio-economic, 
political and ecological conditions. 
In this article, dealing with the Nile River wa-
ter case, the current situation of water resource 
conflicts are analyzed: first, sustainable develop-
ment and water control; second, the Grand Ethi-
opian Renaissance Dam construction and hy-
dro-hegemony change in the Nile River Basin; 
third, changing geo-politics, climate change, and 
ecological security.
II. Sustainable Development and Water 
Control 
1. Source of Conflict or Opportunity for Coop-
eration
Water is an important component of sustain-
able development, Rani explains, and without it 
survival is not possible. Although it is available 
in great quantity but accessibility to fresh water 
is limited, which makes it an important element 
for lives. Water supply has become unhygienic to 
people due to reasons like lack of economic in-
frastructure and poor conditions. There are sever-
al countries in the world which face acute water 
shortage as well as poor water quality. It hampers 
their water security and also brings negative im-
pacts on food security and the livelihood of people 
as well. Lack of water resources invites droughts 
which further make lives of people more misera-
ble, exacerbate starvation and cause malnutrition. 
Global warming has made water a restricted re-
source which is very much important for human 
lives. Therefore the proper management of water 
resources must bring sustainable development. 
Water plays a vital role in strengthening the eco-
nomic and social existence of human beings (Rani: 
1). The term water security means when there is a 
threat to sustainable and secure water utilization 
from both natural and manmade forces on water 
resources. It is also society’s ability to ensure sus-
tainable access to safe, hygiene and sufficient wa-
ter resources (Rani: 4; Takemura).
There have been several examples of countries 
which are dependent on other/neighboring coun-
tries for water resources, according to Rani. Six 
European countries (Switzerland, Liechtenstein, 
Austria, Germany, France and Netherlands) share 
the water content of Rhine River. Nile River, the 
longest river in the world, is a source of life for 
countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Congo 
DR, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South 
Sudan, Sudan and Egypt. Mekong River flows 
through China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cam-
bodia and Vietnam. The river acts as a main trade 
route between China and Southeast Asian coun-
tries (Rani: 4-5).
The competition to acquire more water re-
sources has led to conflict between countries, Rani 
continues. Those which are already sharing water 
resources are fighting for the quantity and quali-
ty of its water content (Rani: 5). There is serious 
concern of gradual decrease in water quantity and 
quality which may cause internal instability in a 
country in future. It can also become a reason of 
conflict between particular groups or within states 
which can further affect the security environment 
at international level (Rani: 8). Global water crisis 
is a serious concern to human security. Millions of 
people lack access to sufficient quantity of fresh 
and safe water for their wellbeing. At present this 
is the greatest threat humans are facing. To count-
er the threat of water crisis and conflict, countries 
should frame better policies for the management 
of scarce water resources (Rani: 9; Petersen-Perl-
man et al.; Waslekar et al.; Kliot et al.).
In short, Rani concludes, water management is 
significant for achieving sustainable development 
as sustainability is not just minimizing the person-
al needs. It is optimizing them for the future gen-
erations. If we manage water resources now then 
only we will be able to save it for our future. If we 
maintain and sustain the available water resourc-
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es at present only then we and the generations to 
come will be able to use it for long term in the 
future. And countries should also make efforts to 
keep all the resources of water clean so that liv-
ing beings can use it for their survival now and in 
the coming future. This goal of sustainable water 
security can be achieved with mutual cooperation 
only. Therefore the water resources should be con-
verted into a source and opportunity for cooper-
ation rather than merely conflict for sustainable 
development (Rani: 9; Wouters).
2. Conflict over Common Property Resourc-
es (CPRs): Global Strategies over Water 
Management
In the present world, proper management of 
common property resources (CPRs) are crucial, 
Ahmad explains, since CPRs are present on the 
earth in abundance and people tend to over-exploit 
for their economic and political interests. Particu-
larly in the case of transboundary CPRs such as 
water, unsustainable and political interests based 
utilization results in disputes among riparian. 
Therefore, proper management is required for sus-
tainability of transboundary water resources for its 
dependent countries (Ahmad: 1).
CPRs are owned by a community and man-
aged by government or other such potential orga-
nization. Additionally, Ahmad continues, no rules 
restrict consumption of these common resources 
that results to overexploitation and to the distur-
bance and degradation of ecological niche. Water 
resource management is a complex procedure, 
particularly in the case of transboundary water 
resources as they don’t recognize human made 
political boundaries which hold major water man-
agement challenges. The possibility for conflicts 
seems to be highest where most of the land is ei-
ther arid or semi-arid and much of the untapped 
water resources are there in international water 
courses (Ahmad: 14).
In short, since transboundary waters are serv-
ing for more than half of the global population, 
Ahmad insists, their appropriate planning, man-
agement and development are vital to satisfy our 
present and future demands for water and to avoid 
possible water scarcity, crisis and conflicts in fu-
ture. However, unfortunately most of waters have 
been and continuously inappropriately managed 
and developed. This trend is emerged due to lack 
of adequate agreements among the riparian coun-
tries and to some extent due to the lack of financial 
resources, particularly in developing countries. 
Consequently, these waters have been the roots of 
several conflicts among the water sharing coun-
tries (Ahmad: 14)
III. The ‘Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam’ Construction and ‘Hydro-He-
gemony’ Change in the Nile River 
Basin
1. Transboundary Water Disputes and Con-
flicts over the Nile River
The impacts of the Nile on the politics of the 
North African region have been so significant that 
they threaten to spark an interstate conflict, which 
could potentially destabilize the whole area. The 
countries in the Basin depend heavily on the Nile, 
which is the only major renewable source of wa-
ter in the area, consequently, it is essential to their 
food and water security (Di Nunzio: 1).
The Egyptian and Sudanese monopoly over 
the water resources in previous years had served to 
exacerbate regional tensions, Di Nunzio explains. 
The signing of various agreements during colonial 
times allowed for this distribution. The two most 
prominent agreements were signed between Egypt 
and Britain (1929) and Egypt and Sudan (1959). 
Increased co-operation between upstream nations 
has resulted in the binding Entebbe Agreement, 
which is restructuring allocations and control over 
the Nile’s resources. The geo-political shift in the 
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region has led to a proliferation of upstream devel-
opments, including dams and irrigation networks. 
These developments are often met with threats 
from Egypt, which is extremely protective over 
its decreasing share of the Nile’s water. However, 
Egypt must engage in peaceful interstate co-oper-
ation to secure its water supplies. The Nile faces 
an uncertain future amid developmental and envi-
ronmental pressures (Di Nunzio: 2; Swain 2008).
Egypt’s extreme reliance on the Nile for its 
electricity, water and food security is the major 
source of conflict in the river basin, Di Nunzio 
continues. A tenth of Egypt’s electricity genera-
tion capacity comes from the Aswan Dam alone. 
Egypt already overdraws on its water allocation 
but is still extremely water scarce. As the popula-
tion booms, the country will require more water 
than it currently has available. However, shifting 
geostrategic alliances among upstream nations 
mean that its allocation is likely to decrease. Un-
less it embarks on a large-scale overhaul of its in-
efficient water networks, Egypt could experience 
major water crises in coming years that could 
trigger conflicts with its neighbors (Di Nunzio: 
4). More recently, Ethiopia’s the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD), 50 kilometers from 
the Sudanese border, has drawn substantial criti-
cism, largely due to Egypt’s hostile response to its 
construction. Sudan, on the other hand, has been 
largely peripheral in the disputes over the GERD, 
downplaying the dam’s potential negative effects 
and throwing its support behind Ethiopia. Egypt 
views the construction of Africa’s largest dam as a 
threat to its national security, given the vulnerabil-
ity of its declining water supplies (Di Nunzio: 6).
In short, Di Nunzio concludes, though inter-
national conflict still presents a risk, several fac-
tors, including pre-existing domestic unrest in the 
region, leave the countries with little option other 
than co-operation and thus diminish its likelihood. 
The internationally recognized Entebbe Agree-
ment leaves Egypt and Sudan outnumbered, while 
other geo-strategic alliances severely limit Egypt’s 
military options. It is in the interests of all the ri-
parian nations to preserving regional stability. As 
already mentioned, even in the absence of inter-
national tensions over its distribution, the river’s 
water resources would still be depleting. Conse-
quently, the ensuing situation will demand other 
alternatives, which could stabilize North Africa’s 
water and food security. International cooperation 
is thus the only viable and peaceful solution to this 
growing problem (Di Nunzio: 8-9; Mohamed et 
Fig.1. White and Blue Niles, and the site of the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Source: Yihdego, 
Y., A. Khalil, and H. S. Salem (2017). Nile Riv-
er’s Basin Dispute: perspectives of the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Global 
Journal of Human-Social Science: B. Geogra-
phy, Geo-sciences, Environmental Science and 
Disaster Management 17(2): 7. 
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2. Modern Water Disputes and Management 
in Nile River Basin
In 2011, Abdellauf refers, Ethiopia —the 
greatest contributor to the stream flow, supplying 
around 86% of the Nile’s water — launched the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project, which 
was considered the largest in the world. The huge 
reservoir behind the dam will hold up to 67 billion 
cubic meters of water, and will take up to seven 
years to reach its capacity. This matter aroused 
the Egyptian concerns as the Nile flow into Egypt 
could be cut by 25% during the filling period, 
while most of the water resources of Egypt and 
Sudan originate outside their boundaries: 77% and 
97% respectively (Abdellatif: 1; Ahmed et al.) 
Over the past five years, Abdellauf explains, 
a dispute has aroused between Egypt, Sudan, and 
Ethiopia. While Egypt holds to the no-harm doc-
trine, and its historical rights based on the colo-
nial treaties, Ethiopia argue that the unfair treaties 
made by the colonists should not be in action after 
the independence of the riparian states. Finally on 
March 2015, the three countries signed an agree-
ment which defines the main principles of water 
use and rights (Abdellatif: 1). Egypt’s argument 
has always been based on its historical rights in 
the water of the Nile, and the no-harm doctrine, 
while the Ethiopian argument is based on the equi-
table use principle and territorial sovereignty over 
its own resources. Due to the weak authoritative 
power of the Nile Basin Institute (NBI) over the 
basin, it could not resolve the dispute between the 
countries. That dispute has shown the disability 
of the NBI in front of the power and interests of 
the riparian states (Abdellatif: 9). The colonial 
agreements are mostly the reason behind the dis-
pute. The negative effects of those treaties are 
still traceable, which were formulated to serve the 
sovereignty of the Britain colony and its hegemo-
ny over the water resource of the Nile River. The 
complexity of the dispute comes from the Egyp-
tian persistence on its historical rights based on the 
colonial agreements, and the planned massive de-
velopment projects of Ethiopian on the Blue Nile, 
which will give it a total domination over the main 
water source of the river. Therefore the only way 
to resolve the current dispute would be through 
multi-lateral agreements between the countries, 
but it will not be a guarantee of non-occurrence of 
other future disputes. (Abdellatif: 9)
The unbalanced distribution of power and in-
terests in the basin still puts a burden on formu-
lating a strong governance framework, Abdellauf 
insists. The absence of a strong regional author-
itative entity — like the European Union in Eu-
rope— which can resolve the disputes, led to a 
trembling political relation between the riparian 
states. The formation of such an entity can raise 
the trust between the states, and set down the main 
principles of governing the Nile River (Abdellat-
if: 10). It was hard to implement a bottom-up ap-
proach in the governance of the Nile River basin, 
due to the weak political situation of most of the 
riparian states and the unbalanced distribution of 
power. The riparian states were left to meet on the 
common ground of the international principles 
of the UN convention. However, the top-down 
norm diffusion was not successful in the case of 
the Nile River basin, mostly due to the left trac-
es of the treaties made under the colonial rule. 
These traces were represented in the norm clash 
between the up-stream countries and the down-
stream countries, where the up-stream countries 
used the equitable utilization and the territorial 
sovereignty principles as their argument, while the 
down-stream countries used their historical rights 
and the no harm doctrine as theirs (Abdellatif: 10).
In short, the UN Convention principles have 
not met the interests of most of the riparian states. 
This was clear in the voting for the adoption of the 
UN convention principles, in which most of the 
states abstained. Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanza-
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nia have abstained, while Burundi voted against it. 
Eritrea, Uganda, and DRC were absent, and only 
Kenya and Sudan voted in favor of the principles. 
Egypt and Ethiopia, who have opposite political 
interests, have both abstained which shows that 
neither the up-stream nor the down-stream ripar-
ian states believed that the convention principles 
do not serve their arguments (Abdellatif: 10).
3. Confrontation of Nile Riparian ‘Hydro-He-
gemony’
Freshwater is essential to life, intrinsically, ac-
cording to Nielsen, so the fight to secure access to 
water becomes the fight to secure the survival of 
a civilization. In certain regions of the world, the 
groundwater ― and the rainfall that replenishes 
it ― is so scarce that the civilizations have to rely 
solely on rivers that originate thousands of kilo-
meters away. Egypt is such a civilization, prompt-
ing the Greek historian Herodotus to comment 
“Egypt is a gift of the Nile” ― it would simply not 
exist without this river (Nielsen: 3-4)
The Nile is shared by eleven riparian states, 
Nielsen continues, but the allocation of water 
shares is highly asymmetric. Historically, Egypt 
receives the lion’s share of the benefits but attri-
butes no water to the Nile, while Ethiopia as the 
main contributor of water utilizes a meager 1 per-
cent of its available water from the Nile. However, 
in recent years Ethiopia has challenged Egyptian 
hydro-hegemony on multiple arenas and through 
a multitude of tactics (Nielsen: 71). At the source 
of the Nile, Ethiopia is battling against recurring 
famines, drought and enduring poverty. The Nile 
represents an enormous potential to alleviate this 
hardship. Contrary to Egypt, which has already 
built an industry around the Nile that it wishes to 
protect, Ethiopia has little industry but is eager to 
harness the power of the Nile to develop the coun-
try’s economy and living standards (Nielsen: 4).
Through the analytical framework of ‘hy-
dro-hegemony’, Nielsen emphasizes the role of 
power asymmetry in establishing and maintain-
ing a favorable position in regional hydro polit-
ical questions. ‘Hydro-hegemony’ is a reflection 
of one state’s ability to dictate the agenda on a 
transboundary river basin through tactics such as 
coercion-pressure, treaties, knowledge construc-
tion, etc. Due to historical factors, Egypt has been 
able to successfully maintain its hydro-hegemonic 
status through employing an array of the tactics 
mentioned above (Nielsen: 71; Obengo; Okascha: 
Ibrahim).
Political tensions between Egypt and Ethi-
opia as a result of the unilateral construction of 
the project GERD, and the Ethiopian refusal to 
halt construction until the required studies were 
concluded, according to Tawfik, have fed the his-
torical mistrust between the two countries. Each 
country has sought to maintain old alliances and 
form new regional relations to influence the inter-
ests of the other in the Nile basin and the Horn 
of Africa. This approach continued even after the 
two countries reached a general understanding on 
resolving the crisis over the GERD, pointing to 
continuing mutual suspicion that will require time 
and effort to overcome. This raises doubts about 
the contribution of the GERD to cooperation be-
yond the project. More generally, the visions of 
Egypt and Ethiopia for the bases of regional coop-
eration remain at odds (Tawfik: 39; Abdelhady et 
al.; Martens).
However, according to Bodin, the real issues 
that need addressed are much more odious. Ex-
plosive population growth, climate change effects, 
unresolved differences among riparian states, and 
extensive selling and leasing of arable basin land 
to foreign states and multinational corporations 
threaten to diminish the Nile’s water volume and 
flow, which will lead to a massive humanitarian 
crisis. The only way these issues can be resolved 
is that the 11 riparian states find common ground 
and form a comprehensive water management re-
gime which can effectively tackle the four issues 
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(Bodin: 2; Tsega; Mckenzie; Al Hajjaji; Yimer).
In short, Grandi concludes, the historical in-
ter-state dispute over the allocation and utilization 
of the Nile River waters has endured ever-evolving 
patterns of intra-basin relationships, multi-level 
dynamics of water policy making and fluctuating 
intensity in conflictive and cooperative interac-
tions. The transboundary nature of the Nile waters 
reveals the interconnectedness of the Nile states, 
which rely upon the Nile ecosystem not only for 
the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural 
needs, but also for the maintenance of peace and 
security in the region (Grandi: ix).
IV. Changing Geopolitics, Climate Change, 
and ‘Ecological Security’
1. Challenges for Water Sharing in the Nile 
Basin: Changing Geopolitics and Climate 
Change
Since the late 1990s, with the encouragement 
and support of the international community, the 
Nile basin countries have made some attempts to 
establish basin-wide cooperative institutions. This 
process of engagement and collaboration is pres-
ently under severe stress due to increasing demand 
and decreasing supply of water resources in the 
basin. This situation may be complicated further 
by the global climate change, which is anticipated 
to result in long-term changes in the volume and 
pattern of runoff in the Nile River system (Swain 
2011: 687).
Most of the areas covered by the Nile River 
basin are projected to become warmer during this 
century, increasing the demand for freshwater, 
Swain continues. On the supply side, there are 
quite a few question marks over water availability. 
There is still lack of consensus about the project-
ed changes in the basin’s climatic means and ex-
tremes. Due to substantial inter-model differences 
of precipitation, quantitative estimates of project-
ed water supply changes are not easy to determine 
in an exact manner. There is also the possibility 
of local climate changes making it further difficult 
to assess a basin-wide trend. However, there is a 
strong likelihood that the climate change is going 
to multiply the uncertainty factor of the Nile River 
flow and may bring steady and significant reduc-
tion to it (Swain 2011: 697).
Moreover, Swain insists, climate change can 
further influence the sharp variability of the Nile 
water flows, which can possibly pose serious chal-
lenges for the water management in the basin. 
As global climate change might bring longterm 
changes to the volume and pattern of runoff in the 
Nile River systems, it is crucial to assess the qual-
ity and capability of on-going sharing arrange-
ments to address this challenge. Climate-related 
changes require comprehensive adjustments in 
the on-going water management structure of the 
Nile River. This comprehensive effort might ask 
for the water sharing arrangements to be flexible 
and adaptable in allocating reduced and surplus 
water flow, maintaining a certain water quality 
level, sustaining ecosystems, controlling flood and 
protecting existing water development infrastruc-
tures. Thus, the river sharing arrangements need 
to have provision for information sharing, conflict 
management mechanisms, flexibility to adjust to 
uncertainties and endeavor for basin-based devel-
opment strategy (Swain 2011: 698; Zedan; Mosta-
fa et al.).
In the Nile basin, Swain analyzes, the agree-
ment among the disputing lower riparian countries 
to constitute the Nile Basin Initiative in 1999 was 
certainly a right step towards basin-based water 
management. However, more than a decade has 
passed, and no concrete progress has been made. 
In reality, very little progress has taken place to 
establish effective and cooperative water manage-
ment institutions in the basin. Most of the riparian 
countries seriously continue to pursue large-scale 
unilateral dam construction. The international 
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community, particularly the World Bank, has been 
claiming the credit since 1999 for creating a plat-
form for a basin-based water cooperative frame-
work. However, the on-going stand-off between 
Egypt and Sudan with the upper riparian countries 
over an article of the Cooperative Framework 
Agreement shows shallowness in the claim. In 
fact, the Nile basin is far from achieving a ba-
sin-based water management institutional struc-
ture (Swain 2011: 698; Woldetsadik).
In short, Swain concludes, a large part of the 
Nile basin is considered as one of the poorest re-
gions of the world. Water scarcity is a major chal-
lenge for this already closed basin. The challenge 
is further exacerbated by climate variability. Thus, 
the immediate national interests of the riparian 
countries are taking priority over the basinbased 
strategy. After a decade of failed attempts to ini-
tiate cooperation, the countries of the Nile basin 
have again started adopting conflicting postures 
over the water. It is necessary for the important 
riparian states of the Nile basin to abandon their 
state-centric water development approach and de-
velop sustainable cooperation over the shared wa-
ter to meet the climate change challenges (Swain 
2011: 701).
2. Transboundary Rivers within ‘Ecological 
Security’ Perspective
Beyond the sustainable security, Atvur ex-
plains, the concept of ‘ecological security’ which 
brought a new discussion to the security litera-
ture, also offers an appropriate basis for linking 
environmental protection, and equal and fair 
distribution of natural resources by developing 
binding regulations for states or elaborating new 
international regimes. Maintaining a dynamic bal-
ance between nature and human societies, needs 
of human beings and other species is the focus of 
the ecological security. Furthermore, ecological 
security could be linked to common security by 
prioritizing ‘interdependence, complexity, uncer-
tainty, harmony and sustainability’ for preserving 
the long-term ecological equilibrium (Atvur: 230).
The importance of water for life and the pur-
suit of ecological cycles that guarantees the func-
tioning of ecosystems shifted the global agenda 
in order to cope with deepening interdependent 
problems and new challenges, Atvur continues. In 
this context, ecological security is one of the new 
approaches that offer a new perspective to envi-
ronmental problems by changing classical security 
agenda. In an ecological perspective, the nature is 
the core value. Ecological approach underlines the 
interconnections, mutual benefits and harms with 
the aim of dealing with the main cause of the en-
vironmental issues and related security problems. 
Especially by improving water security concept 
which is accepted as an important tool for ensur-
ing social, political, economic and environmental 
stability, it is possible to set new regulations for 
management and protection of water resources. 
Moreover, regarding transboundary waters which 
have been at the focus of security and conflict 
studies, it is argued that ecological security ap-
proach would deepen cooperation instead of con-
flict between riparian states, and also improve the 
natural condition of watercourses as ecological 
entities (Atvur: 239; Swain 2012; Paisley et al.).
In this perspective, Atvur analyzes, the Nile 
Basin as a transboundary river with its potential 
of conflict and cooperation is examined in order 
to discuss the possibilities and difficulties to elab-
orate ecological security. It is obvious that trans-
boundary water issues have generally been linked 
to state politics or positions regarding state inter-
est, even though international conventions suggest 
a balanced structure considering ecological prior-
ities, social development and state’s sovereignty. 
The Nile case shows that despite conflicts or dis-
agreements between riparian states, transbound-
ary cooperation with the aim of environmental 
protection could be built and it can be functional 
for solving the transboundary problems. Howev-
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er, whilst there are no coercive mechanisms or 
binding regulations towards cooperation and pro-
tection, different challenges to the ecological in-
tegrity and security in the region continue (Atvur: 
239-240).
Even though the riparian states’ interests have 
mostly been controversial, Atvur insists, trans-
boundary impacts of ecological degradation and 
interconnection between ecological, socio-eco-
nomic and political problems necessitate the 
cooperation and elaboration of a common per-
spective. It could be suggested that ecological 
security which considers natural resources as an 
independent entity and aim to ensure the safety of 
common interests, would help to solve existing 
problems in transboundary basins through the co-
operation (Atvur: 240). 
In sum, Atvur concludes, cooperation between 
riparian countries instead of competition would 
be an important step towards conservation, equi-
table sharing and inheritance to next generations 
of these vital resources. Ecological security of the 
transboundary river maintained by cooperation 
could become the keystone of egalitarian, ecolog-
ical and fair regime that would ensure equitable 
use of water resources. Hence, if security concerns 
prioritize interdependent ecological problems in-
stead of states’ interests or strategic superiorities, 
cooperation in transboundary basins might solve 
ecological, socio-economic and political prob-
lems, contribute to ensure regional stability and 
peace between riparian states, and protect ecologi-
cal integrity of the transboundary resource. Adop-
tion of ecological security approach by riparian 
states could transform political choices towards 
common interests and cooperation for sustainable 
protection of natural resource and peace at the ba-
sin level as well (Atvur: 240).
V. Conclusions
Global climate change will pose a wide range 
of challenges to freshwater resources, altering wa-
ter quantity, quality, system operations, and im-
posing new governance complications. For coun-
tries whose watersheds and river basins lie wholly 
within their own political boundaries, adapting to 
increasingly severe climate changes will be dif-
ficult enough. When those water resources cross 
borders, affecting multiple political entities and 
actors, sustainable management of shared water 
resources in a changing climate will be especially 
difficult. Shared waters can be a source of conflict, 
but they can also be a source of cooperation and 
negotiation. Future pressures, such as population 
and economic growth and climate change, could 
increase tensions, even in areas that in the past 
have been characterized by cooperation. 
Yet, shared challenges may also be a platform 
for developing new institutional arrangements to 
plan for the future. Joint monitoring programs can 
improve cooperation among nations and data col-
lection capacities. This exchange of information 
provides a number of benefits, including expand-
ing and deepening our understanding of climate 
change impacts and vulnerabilities, and improv-
ing hydrological and socioeconomic models. Such 
programs should include water flow and a range 
of water-quality parameters. Additionally, early 
warning systems should be developed in order 
to reduce the impacts of extreme events. Ripari-
an countries should work on common scenarios 
and models to develop a joint understanding of 
possible impacts. Transboundary cooperation can 
broaden our knowledge base, enlarge the range of 
measures available for prevention, preparedness 
and recovery, and so help identify better and more 
cost effective solutions.
Now the very famous “Egypt is a gift of the 
Nile.” (Herodotos, B.C. 5C) should be changed 
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to “The Nile basin countries are gifts of the Nile” 
(A.D. 21C).
[Notes]
1) This article is based on the paper titled ‘Intensifying 
Global Natural Resource Conflicts, Climate Change, 
and Introducing International Environmental Court’, 
and presented at the 75th Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of Criminology, 13-16 November 
2019, San Francisco, CA, U.S.A.
2) This article is a part of research results of “Research 
on Environmental- and Eco-crimes by Progress of 
Scientific Technologies and Development of Societ-
ies and Measures against Them 2015-2019” (Subject 
Number: 15K03181) and “Research on North-South 
Integrated Global Green Criminology and the Foun-
dation of International Environmental Court 2019–
2023” (Subject Number: 19K01353) supported by 
the Grant-in-Aid of Scientific Research by Japanese 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology. These works were and are supported by 
JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP15K03181, and 
JP19K01353.
3) Although the author arranged the on-the-spot inves-
tigation of the Nile basin to visit some places and 
institutes in August 2019, Japanese Ministry of Edu-
cation warned us for the danger in front of us: deadly 
outbreak of Ebola in Democratic Republic of Con-
go and a part of Republic of Uganda. As the author 
could not visit there, this research is based on not the 
field research but the literature research.
4) I would like to express my thanks to my colleagues 
for their help: Professor Shem O. Wandiga (Univer-
sity of Nairobi, Republic of Kenya) and members of 
his research group, and Professor Emmanuel Kasim-
bazi (Makerere University, Republic of Uganda).
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